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ACTION ITEMS

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000800040045-7

Morning Meeting of 12 February 1973 (Excerpt)

The Director noted some of his first impressions after a week at CIA. He said there are some people who work extremely hard, but others appear to be not fully engaged. He commented on a cloistered atmosphere that exists within which there is some smugness and complacency about the quality of the Agency's work that is not totally justified. He said the gap between the internal and external image of the Agency is too wide, although it is appropriate that those within it view it positively. He noted that young officers join the Agency and become immersed in the institution. He said there are many good people whose intellectual capacities are not sufficiently engaged in service to their customers and the USG. He commented that intelligence is becoming even more important as the problems of the Cold War are being succeeded by even more complex interactions of political forces, and the former U.S. differential over the USSR is being reduced. The Director said that the key question at the moment is whether the U.S. is getting intelligence as good as it should, on which he called himself a skeptic. He noted that the gist behind the 5 November Presidential Directive is that analysis is the toughest yet cheapest part of the intelligence process, noting that collection is relatively voluminous (even perhaps too much so). Noting that competing analytical efforts are wholesome, the pay-off comes in satisfying ourselves that Dr. Kissinger and other policy makers are getting the best analyses that one can provide. Noting in particular Dr. Kissinger's request for analysis of Soviet objectives with respect to strategic weapons as an input to SALT, the Director advised that the resulting study should be given about a "C" and may be the product of the production treadmill he spoke of last week. He advised that he will meet with the DDS&T and others on this matter this morning. He suggested that we set up groups to critique our analysis and build a record as to its value. He noted that the purpose of analysis is to broaden the perception and understanding of the decision makers, so it must be responsive to them, however capricious or repetitive their question might appear. He commented that aspirations, however, must not be aimed only at the highest level and give perfunctory attention to others, as the latter can also shape policy and needs reasonable attention so a reasonable batting average can be developed. He asked that Executive Committee members provide a two- or three-page paper on what is wrong in their sphere of influence and what can be done about it. Noting his familiarity with organizations that have reached the age of twenty-five and can become ossified, he asked that we look at the Agency as a whole and see what can be done to revitalize it (Action: All Executive Committee members).

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